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The State, Virtue, Sex and Chastity 
by 
Jack Healy, O. Cum. 
The right to privacy covers a multitude of sins, not the least of which are 
sexual. Because sex is private, so the reasoning goes, the state has no business 
involving itself in sexual matters. Polis and eros have nothing to do with each 
other. Of course, the political decision to distribute condoms in high schools 
contradicts such reasoning. Nevertheless, the politicians who legislate in favor of 
contraception and, even worse, abortion, continue to deny the interest of the state 
in the sexual lives of its citizens. But the spread of AIDS has changed that, 
exposing as a political dodge the specious appeal to the right to privacy when the 
common good of the polis is undermined by the sexual activities of some of its 
citizens. This paper advances the position that the common good and the state's 
interest are best served not by legislation, thus far ill-conceived, but by education 
in virtue, specifically chastity. 
That the state has an interest in virtue must in today's society sound like a 
ludicrous idea. Yet it is as ancient as Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics. In 
fact, both Plato and Aristotle regarded the study of virtue as a branch of political 
science. They reasoned that since man existed only in society, that is, in the (city-) 
state, the state and the individual, therefore, had the same end, namely, to attain 
the good life. l Thus, for example,justice should inform not only the operations of 
the state but also the actions of its citizens. The case, of course, was the same for 
the other three virtues discussed in the Republic: prudence (actually "wisdom"), 
fortitude and temperance. If either the state or its citizens was party to moral 
corruption, the good life was imperilled. It is understandable, then, that "Plato 
was not a man to accept the notion that there is one morality for the individual 
and another for the state."2 
While such notions as "virtue", "the good life", man's proper "end" are not 
foreign to us, the original context for understanding them largely escapes the 
contemporary mind. Herein lies its difficulty for accepting the ancients' refusal to 
dichotomize morality into a public sphere and a private sphere. The difficulty is 
further compounded by the fact that in the development of western thought the 
study of virtue lost its moorings in political science and, by the time ofImmanuel 
Kant, was consigned to the subjective and private realm where, of course, 
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religion was banished. To this day, the modem mind cannot dissociate morality 
and religion, with the result that in the public forum any mention of morality 
raises the battle cry against "imposing one's religious beliefs on others." The 
Cuomo-syndrome of being "personally against/politically for" abortion is 
another indication of today's moral dichotomizing. 
The Original Context 
What was the original context that made virtue, the good life and man's end 
intelligible, and made splitting morality into public and private spheres 
inadmissible? Although they practiced piety towards the gods, the ancients were, 
of course, devoid of revelation. Hence their only source for ascertaining man's 
proper end, his true good and the virtue needed for its attainment was reason. For 
the Greeks, man was by essence animal rationale, distinguished from aU other 
beings by an ability to think and to choose. He exercised this ability in a world 
which was harmonious and orderly because governed by principles intrinsic to 
every being. In speaking of the principle which determined the behavior of any 
creature of a certain kind, the Greeks used the term "nature." Empirically, the 
nature of fire differed from that of a rock or a bird. Each behaved differently as, 
indeed, did man whose nature, governed by the law of reason, accorded him 
freedom of choice in his behavior. But here lies the rub. For the ancients, every 
nature, even a nature characterized by knowledge and freedom, operated within 
a teleological context. That is, every nature was bound by a built-in purpose or 
goal. 
The notion dates back to Socrates and became fundamental in the thought-
system of Plato and Aristotle. A thing was structured by its nature to operate 
toward a specific end which Plato and Aristotle equated with its "good". Within 
this teleology, the good was defined by Aristotle as "that at which all things 
aim,"3 the end or purpose wherein the thing's mode of acting came to term. Since 
end and good were really one and the same, the proper and purposeful 
functioning of a thing was simultaneously the realization of its good. We may 
note too that in this scheme, good is not in the first instance something that lies 
outside the thing but rather something intrinsic to its nature, specifically, its 
actions. Naturally, in the case of man whose nature permitted him free choice in 
his actions, the question was paramount as to what constituted his actions good 
or what purposeful activity enabled him to realize his nature. It was within this 
teleological framework that the issue of virtue arose. 
As mentioned earlier, ethics was a branch of political science because the 
ancients admitted no distinction between the end and good of the state and that of 
the individual. In answer to the question concerning what was for the state and 
the individual the supreme good or end to which all else was subordinated, Plato 
and Aristotle both agreed, eudaimonia, that is, happiness.· Through ample 
discussion they arrived at the content of that happiness: the life of virtue. Says 
Aristotle, "Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is 
the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of 
good actions."s Thus, it was for the attainment of virtue that states acted, for 
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example, in governing by laws and that individuals acted, for example, in 
cultivating certain interior dispositions. Because of this common good or end, 
Plato could propose that between the happiness of the just man and that of the 
ideal state, there was a real analogy as there was between the justice or right order 
informing the state and that informing the polity of the soul.6 
Virtue Identified 
While the good life was one of happiness and happiness was a life of virtue, 
what exactly was virtue? Following in the footsteps of Socrates, Plato identified 
virtue with knowledge. Although he admitted distinct virtues, such as the four 
moral virtues which he mentions in the Republic, they found their unity in 
knowiedge. Plato held to the belief that no man chooses de facto evil knowingly 
but rather mistakes it for the good. Consistent with his teleological viewpoint, 
Plato claims that all choices which a man makes are sub ratione bon~ by reason of 
the good he perceives. Logically then, a man's moral failure and responsibility are 
in function of his ignorance. 
However limited Plato's view on virtue, the equation of virtue and knowledge 
does assume, and indeed, require that virtue be taught. That project, of course, fell 
to the state which found embodiment in Plato's famous "philosopher-king." Be 
that as it may, it was Aristotle who made the project practical and brought it, so to 
speak, within the grasp of the ordinary citizen. Owing to what one author called 
his "analytical habit of mind," Aristotle de-etherealized the notions of good and 
virtue and with "psychological delicacy" placed them within an ethics of will and 
intention.7 
For Aristotle, it is only partly true that happiness consists in a life of virtue. For 
him the happiness which is the good or end of man must also admit knowledge 
(wisdom) and pleasure. In this hierarchy of wisdom, virtue and pleasure, wisdom 
pertains to man's highest faculty, viz., reason, virtue to the powers and appetites 
of his soul, and pleasure, the attendant result of wisdom and virtue. Jacques 
Maritain, taking his lead from Aristotle, says that man's happiness is as complex 
as man himself and is thus made up "of matter and spirit, of sense and 
intelligence, of animal conditioning and rational, even supra-rational freedom, all 
of this crowned, and guided by wisdom and contemplation."8 In short, happiness 
involves the total man, body and soul. Furthermore, the teleological framework 
of Aristotle's thought required that man act toward the good in such a manner 
that his choices be in accord with his rational nature. It is in reference to these 
choices and their concomitant effect on man's soul that Aristotle defines virtue. 
In his Nichomachean Ethics he says "the virtues are modes of choice or involve 
choice ... [they are] states of character.''9 Aristotle calls them "excellences" that 
perfect man in his choices and enable him to make them with ease. Virtue, to 
quote Maritain again, is a "stable disposition which fortifies and perfects the 
powers of the soul in respect to the right use of freedom."lo This "right use of 
freedom" finds its explanation in Aristotle's notion of what today we call "the 
happy median," that is, the notion that "virtue lies in the middle." To use 
Aristotle's words, "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, 
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lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to US."II Aristotle conceives virtue as a mean 
between the two extremes of excess and defect with regard to man's feelings and 
actions. Thus, for example, courage is the mean relative to the feelings of 
confidence which at the extreme of defect makes a man's character cowardly and 
at the extreme of excess makes it rash and foolhardy. Liberality is the mean 
between miserliness and prodigality; wholesome pride between false humility and 
puffed-up vanity; pleasant wit between boorishness and buffoonery: etc. 
These myriad vices or extremes which affect man's character are hard to name, 
says Aristotle. What is more, the median position which virtue assumes between 
them cannot be determined with mathematical precision. Human feelings and 
actions are far too complex for that. For this reason Aristotle defines virtue s.s the 
mean "relative to us," that is, it is relative not to theoreticians, but to work-a-day 
people who have acquired moral savvy through practical experience. 
In any case, virtues are what the later medieval philosophers called good 
"habits." They are qualities which inform the will, dispose its choices for the good 
and thereby render the character of a man good. Habituated to choose the good, a 
man so perfects his nature that he knows and chooses the good "co-naturally." 
Knowledge and choice of the good are, as it were, "second nature." But to arrive at 
this point requires some doing. After all, virtues are not in-born; they must be 
acquired through education. Moreover, they must be excercised and practiced 
until they become "a state of character." With his analytical habit of mind, 
Aristotle distinguishes the man who merely performs just and temperate acts from 
the man who performs them virtuously. In the latter case, the man acts from a state 
of character; in the former, he does not. Thus, there is a distinction between acts 
which create a good character and acts which flow from a good character already 
created. Aristotle says, "it is by doingjust acts that the just man is produced, and by 
doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have 
even a prospect of becoming good."12 
Before broaching the topic of chastity, we should mention about Aristotle that 
having given examples of virtues as means between two extremes he gives distinct 
coverage to each of the moral virtues. Temperance is the one relevant to our topic 
because chastity is a species of temperance. Of temperance, Aristotle says that it is 
the mean with regard to pleasure, the excess of which is self-indulgence and the 
defect of which is no pleasure. Since pleasure naturally accompanies many human 
activities, like eating or skiing or reading, the pursuit of a man to eliminate pleasure 
must be one of the rarest of vices. Aristotle gropes to find a name for this type of 
defect and makes do with "insensibility." Whatever the defect it seeks to remedy, 
temperance deals largely with the excess of pleasures, most often of the physical 
sort, by which a man indulges his appetites.13 
Finally, it bears mentioning that Aristotle, by way of transition to his book on 
Politics, ends his Nichomachean Ethics by appealing to the state. With consumate 
realism he says, "it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one 
has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not 
pleasant to most people, especially when they are young." With this the case, 
Aristotle cites the opinion that "legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and 
urge them forward by the motive of the noble ... " In the absence of such public 
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concern, says Aristotle, "it would seem right for each man to help his children and 
friends towards virtue ... "14 
That injunction seems hardly to have been followed, if three centuries after its 
writing St. Paul is to be believed. He says of the pagans that "Even the women 
pervert the natural use of their sex by unnatural acts (para phusin). In the same 
way the men give up natural sexual relations with women and bum with passion 
for each other." IS Paul'sjudgment seems harsh but it characterized in the concrete 
the failure of Greek wisdom to make men and women virtuous. Having at Athens 
experienced first-hand the disdain of the Greek philosophers,16 Paul concluded 
that "God in his wisdom made it impossible for people to know him by means of 
their own wisdom." Realizing this, Paul thus proclaimed that "God has made 
Christrto be our wisdom."17 
The gospel and Greek philosophy have had in their encounter enormous 
impact on each other. Leaving that subject to the specialists, however, we note in 
passing that Christianity claimed as the source of its wisdom not mere human 
reason but divine revelation. Essential to that revelation was the fact that Christ 
redeemed man from slavery to sin and corruption and instituted an economy of 
grace wherein man could attain virtue and live a new life. In characterizing this 
new and virtuous life, the Second !ener of Peter uses words with a philosophical 
ring that speak of man sharing in "the divine nature" (theias koinonoi phuseos).18 
Were an ancient Greek to hear such words he would conclude that, in the 
Christian, a new principle operated equipping him to act toward a divine good or 
end which transcended earthly happiness. In short, without prejudice to man's 
natural "telos" or end-in-life, grace empowered man to achieve one that was 
supernatural. 
St. Thomas and Chastity 
It is in relating the order of nature and grace that St. Thomas Aquinas 
manifests his great genius. He does so in the Summa theologiae by effecting a 
remarkable synthesis between the Christian faith and Aristotle. While mingling 
divine and human wisdom, Thomas does not diverge philosophically from 
Aristotle in the matter of the cardinal virtues. We tum, at long last, to Thomas' 
treatment of chastity. 
In his Summa, Thomas, unlike his Greek mentor, gives specific treatment to 
the virtue of chastity.19 While strictly speaking there exist only four cardinal 
virtues, Thomas, like Aristotle, admits by extension sub-species of these. Thus, 
under temperance, Thomas considers as virtues, abstinence, fasting, sobriety, 
chastity and virginity. As an exercise oftemperance, each virtue is defined by the 
sense-object which stirs man's sensual appetite. Hence, the virtues of abstinence, 
fasting and sobriety regulate man's appetite for food and drink while chastity and 
virginity regulate man's appetite for sex. 
To say that the above virtues "regulate" man's appetite requires for the sake of 
clarification a brief digression into the psychology which governed Thomas' 
thinking. Like Aristotle, Thomas understood an appetite to be a thing's bent 
toward a good, or, an inclination towards an end. Moreover, he acknowledged 
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the effects of the sensory appetites when they responded to sense objects. 
According to customary usage, Thomas called those effects, "passions," which 
today we call "feelings." So primal an appetite like that for food or sex necessarily 
stirred in man strong feelings like those of love, desire and pleasure. Of 
themselves such feelings are irrational, products of man's animal nature and in 
need of integration with man's spiritual nature. It is at this juncture of man's 
animal and spiritual nature, that is, at the juncture of his feelings and his reason 
that temperance comes into play. St. Thomas says "that it pertains to moral virtue 
to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that conflict with reason."20 It 
falls, therefore, to temperance to regulate man's appetite for pleasure; to chastity 
to regulate his appetite specifically for sexual pleasure. I 
The virtue of chastity, therefore, introduces reason into the prm Ince of 
sexuality. St. Thomas says that "chastity requires that a person moderate the use 
of his corporeal members in accord with the judgment of reason and the choice of 
the will."2) Were reason and choice barred from this realm, man would be 
tyrannized by his sexual appetites and enslaved by his passions. When speaking 
of reason in the sexual realm, Thomas does not have in mind some persuasive 
logic or argumentation that compels a man, as it were, from the outside, to 
restrain his sexual behavior. Ratio for Thomas is something that has an intrinsic 
reference to reality so that to be in accord with reason means to be right "in itself." 
"The order of reason accordingly signifies that something is disposed in 
accordance with the truth of real things."22 Thus, by introducing "ratio" into the 
sexual sphere, chastity disposes a man so that in exercising his sexual appetites he 
acts "in accordance with the truth of real things". 
Understanding this last phrase is of the utmost importance. To be "in 
accordance with the truth of real things" means to respect their natures. We have 
already defined nature as that principle by which a thing behaves so as to achieve 
its good or end. This teleology provides man not only the basis for objective 
science whereby he discovers purposeful behavior in nature but also an objective 
standard for gauging whether or not his behavior corresponds to the truth of real 
things. This idea of discerning in created things their inner "ratio" and of man's 
need to act in accord with it was refined by Thomas and later called the "theory of 
naturallaw."23 The term ought not to distract us. We need only add that with his 
belief in God the Creator, Thomas viewed the world as governed by God's 
"ratio" which becomes, as it were, the inner law determining creatures toward 
their proper end. In short, God's reason and purpose for each creature is reflected 
in its nature. 
Be that as it may, we may ask relative to our topic on chastity, what is the 
nature or inner "ratio" of sexuality? What is its end or purpose? How is its good 
achieved? It is only by answering these questions that we can appreciate how 
chastity disposes a man vis-a-vis his sexual appetites to act "in accordance with 
the truth of real things." 
Neither Greek nor Christian wisdom ever denied that sex by nature was 
procreative, that it achieved its end or good in the physical generation oflife. Seen 
solely in these terms, however, the exercise of sex between humans and that 
between animals is indistinguishable. But sex that is a human act demands 
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something more. The nature of man requires a permanent and stable relationship 
between male and female if the good of human sexuality is to be properly and 
fully realized. Thus, while sex is by nature procreative, its human realization 
requires the stability of marriage for the proper rearing and nurturing of children. 
Western tradition has, therefore, expressed the good or end of human sexuality 
and marriage as proles and rules, that is, as offspring and fidelity. (Christianity 
added a third term, sacramentum). 24 
Another Dimension 
Yet, in contemporary culture we tend to view human sexual activity 
exclusively in personal terms, that is, as the domain solely ofthe couple engaging 
in it. But there is another dimension that has been consistently recognized since 
the inception of western philosophy. St. Thomas expresses it very clearly: "the 
exercise of sex is of the utmost importance for the common good because it is [for] 
the preservation ofthe human race."2S That is, in their procreative activity, male 
and female assure the continuance of the human race. In their persons they 
represent human nature: "each is one half in that nature and seeks the other half 
to complete a whole ... it is from the level of that nature that the appropriate 
desires well up, so strong and demanded for survival as to call for a special virtue 
to temper them according to reason."26 Chastity is, of course, that virtue 
regulating man's sexual appetite in accordance with the good end of sex, namely, 
"proles" and "fides." 
In grasping the "ratio" or true nature of sex, man, therefore, has an objective 
standard by which to gauge whether or not his activity is "in accordance with the 
truth of real things." The moral man lives in such accord while the immoral man 
does not. Well-known and perennial are the failures of the immoral man in 
regard to the "proles" and "fides" of sexuality: contraception, abortion, adultery, 
fornication, homosexuality. In such assaults on the nature of sexuality, the order 
of reason is transgresSed. 
Yet, ironically, in the one who violates the nature of sexuality, the moral failure 
may not be against the virtue of chastity. Why? Because the virtue may not yet be 
present as a "state of character," as an "excellence" or ease in choosing the good, 
as "a stable disposition" perfecting the soul's powers. Rather, the failure, while 
grave, may be at a more superficial level and for this reason deserving another 
name: "incontinence." To fail in continency - today we call it "abstinence" - is 
not to fail in chastity. For the latter is a deep-rooted basic attitude, a second-
nature, a virtue, while the former is an exercise in self-control, a first step or series 
of steps toward virtue, a rough sketch of what yet has to emerge.27 Continency 
leads to chastity as repeated good acts lead to virtue. To fail in continency is 
infirmitas,' to fail in chasisty, malitia. Whether through weakness or wickedness, 
failure in the realm of sexuality is no trivial matter. For given the nature of-
sexuality, unchastity or incontinency affects both the character of the individual 
and the common good. 
With this last comment we come full circle as we return to our opening 
remarks both about the decision of the state to distribute condoms and about 
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the predicament facing society with the spread of AIDS. For who could deny 
that, concerning the matters of condoms and of AIDS, both the character of 
individuals, specifically our youth, and the common good are at stake? Indeed, at 
risk! In both cases the state can claim no moral neutrality, either in fact or in 
principle. As to fact, the decision to make educational facilities conduits for 
condoms makes the state complicit in the inconstinency of those youths using 
them. As to principle, the spread of AIDS in society threatens the common good 
which the state is morally obligated to protect. In light of what we have said in 
this paper about the mutual good of the individual and the state, about the nature 
of happiness, of virtue, of sexuality and of chastity, there is an inherent and tragic 
contradiction in the legislative decision to distribute condoms to prevent AIDS. 
For with the aim of safeguarding the good of society, the state has become party 
to corrupting the good of its citizens. 
As we have seen in classical political thought, to set the good of the state at 
odds with that of man as such is to imperil the good life for both. After all, in 
terms of teleology, man and the state have the same end, which is happiness. 
Furthermore, that happiness is dependent upon man's ability to integrate his 
rational and animal natures, that is, his reason and his appetites and passions. In 
this integration, the acquisition of virtue is so paramount that the ancients saw it 
as a function of the state to promote it. 
If today the state cannot or will not promote virtue, at least it should not 
undermine it. Yet that is precisely what the state is doing where man's need for 
virtue is most poignantly felt, namely, at the level of his sexual appetites. In 
contemporary society, those appetites have gone terribly awry, leading an 
editorial in The Wall Street Journal to ask, "Is it any wonder that the HIV virus is 
spreading among teen-agers? In Washington, D.C., two-thirds of 10th-grade 
boys and one-fifth of 10th-grade girls report that they have recently had four or 
more sex partners .. .. Confronted with the grim shadow of AIDS, educators 
can think only of distributing condoms and appealing for 'safe sex'."28 Under the 
tutelage of a teacher or parent, no teen-ager handed a condom and/or instructed 
in its use can take seriously the admonition for abstinence. As we know, 
abstinence is not even virtue but rather an exercise in self-control which along the 
road toward virtue is a first step. Promoting "safe sex" and condoms denies our 
citizens even that first step. 
The spread of AIDS has made the illicit use of sex a deadly game. For the 
welfare of its citizens the state must educate not in sex but in virtue. The only safe 
sex is that informed by the virtue of chastity. 
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